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Abstract: The texts of the growing canon of intérpretes do Brasil are frequently seen as offering 
firm interpretations of national development, promoting determinate categories of analysis, 
defending Brazil’s virtues, and implying specific corrections for the nation’s faults. Yet some 
notable works of the genre seem to reject the notions that interpreting the past may usefully inform 
the future and that the nation may be in any substantial way explained. This article shows how 
“interpretations” of Brazil as disparate as Machado de Assis’s Esaú e Jacó and Euclides da Cunha’s 
Os Sertões arrive at a skeptical suspension of judgment about the nature, condition, and future of 
the nation. 
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Resumo: Os textos do crescente cânone de intérpretes do Brasil são lidos frequentemente como 
oferecendo interpretações firmes do desenvolvimento national, promovendo categorias de análise 
fixas, defendendo as virtudes do Brasil e sugerindo correções específicas para as faltas da nação. No 
entanto, algumas obras notáveis do gênero parecem rejeitar as suposições de que interpretar o 
passado possa dar forma ao futuro e de que a nação possa ser explicada de maneira significativa. Este 
artigo mostra como “interpretações” do Brasil tão díspares quanto Esaú e Jacó de Machado de Assis 
e Os Sertões de Euclides da Cunha acabam na suspensão cética do juízo no tocante à natureza, 
condição e futuro da nação.  





Introducing his classic anthology of canonical Intérpretes do Brasil, Silviano 
Santiago writes that the works of these writers have served as beacons rather than mirrors 
for Brazilians thinking about the nature and condition of their society, shaping discourse 
and illuminating pathways to action. Authors including Joaquim Nabuco, Paulo Prado, 
Gilberto Freyre, and Sérgio Buarque de Hollanda, to mention just a few of those whose 
writings appear in Santiago’s original collection, offered ambitious interpretations of 
Brazil’s development (or underdevelopment) and supplied determinate categories of 
analysis with which they defended the nation’s virtues and advanced specific corrections 
for its faults.  
Taken historically, the category of interpretations of Brazil collects writings that 
have profoundly shaped the intellectual and political discourse in and about the country, 
particularly prior to the modernization of the university system in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Given the breadth and importance of this historical canon, however, it 
is productive to apply the term analytically and expand the corpus to include other works 
that promise to characterize Brazil and shed light why the nation is as it is. Literary critics, 
often preoccupied with questions of national identity and history, have shown how 
fictional works participate in interpreting the nation, as when Willi Bolle reads João 
Guimarães Rosa’s Grande Sertão: Veredas as a novel of the formation of Brazil and an 
indictment of a false social contract at the founding of the nation; or when Roberto 
Schwarz reads Machado de Assis’s Memórias póstumas de Brás Cubas as exposing the 
Brazilian elite’s cavalier and contemptuous attitude toward their subaltern compatriots. But 
some efforts to interpret Brazil introduce challenging and even painful ambiguities. 
Although these writings boldly face the fundamental question why is Brazil the way Brazil 
is? they may reject the notion that interpreting the past usefully informs the future and 
they may even undercut the hope that, in the end, the nation might be in any substantial 
way explained. In short, having attempted to explain something important about how and 
why Brazil is as it is, they fall, frustrated, into a skeptical suspension of judgment. 
Though there are many varieties of skepticism and much debate about its nature, 
development, and importance in both antiquity and modernity, for our purposes we can 
conceive of a skeptical challenge or argument as one that questions a familiar supposition 
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and that, if unanswered, seems to force the thinker to abandon her commitment to 
fundamental convictions or apparently obvious truths: 
How can I trust what my senses tell me about my surroundings, if I cannot 
rule out the possibilities that I might be suffering a delusion, a vivid dream, or the 
intervention of some powerful being that manipulates my mind and my 
perceptions?  
What right do I have to insist on my dearest intellectual, political, and moral 
convictions, when I know that there are plenty of people who are just as smart as I 
am, who have similar access to the same evidence and argumentation as I do, and 
whose views contradict my own?  
Have I any good reason to believe that other beings are mentally conscious 
at all – how can I be certain that I am not surrounded by automata whose behavior 
resembles mine, but who have no mental life of their own? 
Why should I be confident that the sun will rise tomorrow, if my expectation 
is not based on any reasoning beyond my observation that it has risen before? What 
real basis could I have for presuming that future events will be similar to past ones? 
 
Each of these challenges has been raised and debated among philosophers. In each 
case, although the challenge offers an outlandish position, reflection – and much spilled 
ink – shows that it is not a simple thing to respond without engaging in circular reasoning. 
And in each case, we seem to face the choice between defending our familiar practice 
(though it is unclear if this is possible), carrying on in our usual way without answering 
the skeptical challenge (though this would apparently be irrational), or succumbing to the 
challenge and suspending judgment regarding crucial matters or perhaps everything we 
took for granted before (possibly at the cost of being able to do anything or live at all).  
What might it mean to interpret the Brazilian nation as inexplicable or beyond 
understanding? We begin with the somewhat less controversial example of Machado de 
Assis, long associated with one or another interpretation of skepticism, and continue with 






There is little doubt, ironically, that a certain philosophical skepticism roamed 
among Brazilian intellectuals at the turn of the twentieth century: a certain preoccupation 
with the instability of opinion, a peculiar worry about the fragility and baselessness of 
factual and moral convictions, a suspicion that human reason should seek only to suspend 
judgment rather than grasp at conclusions. Although critics and readers have not always 
distinguished clearly this attitude from a broader or even pathological pessimism, the 
fiction of Machado de Assis has long been read as expressing, developing, or otherwise 
enacting some form of skepticism. Where some have understood Machado’s attitude as a 
flat refusal to endorse the trendy ideas of the time, others have argued that the author 
created a series of characters whose progressively deeper skeptical attitudes permit them to 
attain increasing levels of psychological and social salvation, and still others have contended 
that Machado’s fiction poses the suspension of judgment as a painful, if inevitable, 
condition.
1
 While some have associated the novelist with the ancient Greek tradition of 
Pyrrhonism – taking skepticism as a way of life eased by the balm of suspending judgment 
– others have made much of his reading of Montaigne and Pascal, and still others have 
shown the ways in which Machadian skepticism echoes the anxieties of much modern 
European philosophy in posing the apparent limitations of human knowledge as a 
disturbing dilemma: either give up on our convictions and live without endorsing any 
position regarding any question great or small; or somehow shore up our situation by 
answering questions, long-vexed and still perplexing, that have resisted satisfactory 
resolution for decades, centuries, or millennia.
2
 
But if we take Machado as an intérprete do Brasil, what role will his interest in 
skepticism play in his interpretation? 
Machado’s most flatly political novel, Esaú e Jacó famously follows the meteoric 
trajectory of a pair of twins, the innately conservative Pedro and the instinctively rebellious 
Paulo, through the turbulent later years of the Brazilian monarchy and the tumultuous 
                                                 
1
 See Muricy, Maia Neto, and Nunes. 
2
 See Maia Neto, Krause, Coutinho, Reale, Gai, and Mittelman. 
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early years of the first Republic. Like their biblical ancestors whose names supply the book’s 
title, the twins struggled before birth “no ventre de sua mãe” and their infancy is marked 
by a vague prophecy of future greatness (12). As children they paper the walls of their 
bedroom with warring images of Louis XVI and Robespierre; they invent contradictory 
interpretations of the auspiciousness of their birthday, 7 April 1870: for the traditionalist 
Pedro, the anniversary of Dom Pedro II’s ascent to the throne, but for the reformist Paulo, 
the anniversary of Dom Pedro I’s fall from it. As they grow up, the twins vie for the 
affection and attentions of the unusual Flora, who, unable to fuse the twins into one being 
and unable or unwilling to choose one over the other, falls ill and dies without choosing 
either. 
Drawing repeatedly on the Bible and Dante’s Divine Comedy, and making clear 
reference to significant dates and events during the waning years of slavery and the 
Segundo Reinado, Machado’s interpretation of Brazil easily seems to take the form of 
allegory. As Stephen Hart summarizes critical approaches in this vein, the novel can be 
taken as “an allegory of the failed political experiment of both republicanism and 
monarchism in nineteenth-century Brazil. Flora’s death, according to this formula, would 
be interpreted as the outward manifestation of this internal, political failure” (321). Yet as 
Jobst Welge has written, “Esaú e Jacó is a ‘historical novel’ that is skeptical of the possibility 
of historical narrative” (28). Similarly, Earl Fitz has recently argued, the reader of 
Machado’s novel must “reproduce, through the same language system that gives rise to her 
initial thoughts about the text she is reading, more possible interpretations, more 
explanations about what seems to be happening in the novel and what it means” (136). If 
an allegorical reading is at some level inescapable, we need not oversimplify Machado’s 
interpretation of Brazil by taking the novel’s national allegory to consist of a series of 
simplistic associations such that (a) Pedro = political conservatism, (b) Paulo = political 
radicalism, (c) Flora = the nation of Brazil, (d) Flora’s refusal to choose one of the twins 
= the equivalence of elite conservatism and radicalism in the Old Republic, and finally (e) 
Flora’s death = Brazil’s utter impasse and probable or inevitable failure. Although the 
rivalry between the twins and their relationships with Flora are of central importance in 
the novel, the triangular drama unfolds within a web of relations among other characters, 
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whose contrasting attitudes are equally important to an analysis of Machado’s possible 
allegory. 
The characters who populate Esaú e Jacó are largely distinguished by their 
contrasting intellectual attitudes or how they might answer the question: on what basis 
should one hold an opinion? The young people at the center of the drama – the dogmatic 
twins and their indecisive darling – are joined by a slate of characters marked by weak or 
suspect intellectual attitudes and who, like the twins themselves, are set in fairly obvious 
symmetrical opposition. The twins’ parents, Natividade and Santos, each ground their 
views and expectations by appeal to dubious authorities: Natividade seeks out the fortune-
telling Cabocla of the Morro do Castelo, while Santos consults the Spiritualist master 
Plácido. Though the parents choose different guides – the mother turns to a momentarily 
notable mystic emerging from the popular classes, while the father prefers a fashionable 
medium associated with a supposedly more modern and certainly more European form of 
spirituality – each receives similarly vague advice and predictions that do little but reinforce 
predictable parental concerns regarding their young twin boys. Will they attain success? 
(Almost certainly yes, considering the social position they are born into.) And will they get 
along? (Almost certainly not, apparently for the same reason: as sons of the bourgeois 
Santos, they must distinguish themselves through competition.) 
Flora’s parents, for their part, illustrate quite familiar forces in Brazilian politics that 
have little to do with ideas or arguments. Batista enters the novel as a previously influential 
Conservative whose partisan alignment is based on personal loyalties rather than ideology 
or policy. Dona Cláudia, the more calculating and ambitious of the pair, convinces Batista 
to switch parties and thereby reinvigorate his political career. Compared by Machado’s 
narrator to the Macbeths, Batista and Cláudia represent an approach to politics and 
governance that has no need of intellectual commitment of any kind, but functions strictly 
through the ebb and flow of opportunistic bonding and betrayal – an approach we 
recognize as readily in contemporary Brazil as in past ages. 
As for the twins themselves, each is moved by an innate and unchanging attitude of 
conservatism or radicalism. Though their specific positions shift with time, as when, late 
in the novel, Paulo “entrou a fazer oposição ao governo, ao passo que Pedro moderava o 
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tom e o sentido, e acabava aceitando o regímen republicano, objeto de tantas desavenças” 
(210), their commitments are driven only by their respective embrace or rejection of the 
present status quo. If there is anything capable of affecting the underlying sensibilities that 
govern their particular views, it might be the conflict itself: since the brothers define 
themselves in opposition to one another, any position that appears alluring or even 
palatable to one must become anathema to the other. Their attitudes are mutually 
reinforcing and, in the end, seem to have little to do with any notion of intellectual 
responsibility or any real effort to come to correct conclusions about what is or what should 
be, and redound instead on instinct. 
But while the novel follows the twins most closely, Flora is most directly associated 
with the Brazilian nation, or at least a possible future for it. Not only coming of age, as do 
Pedro and Paulo, with the abrupt shocks of the Lei Áurea of 1888 and the Proclamation of 
the Republic in 1889, but also, crucially, born with the Law of the Free Womb of 1871 – 
which foretold the eventual end of slavery in Brazil while stopping well short of immediate 
abolition and any form of reparation – Flora seems to embody the possibility of a reborn 
Brazil constituted by the paradigmatic modern values of liberty, equality, and justice. And 
though the triangular courtship story would suggest that her situation should be analyzed 
in relation to twins’, the specificity of her attitude becomes clear only in comparison to the 
figure of Conselheiro Aires. Unlike the other major characters, who adopt and abandon 
opinions for dubious reasons, Aires and Flora avoid committing to specific views, though 
they do this in different ways and with quite different results. Aires, the easy-living ex-
diplomat, goes by the title of ‘Conselheiro’ while claiming that the honorific “é um título 
que o imperador me conferiu, por achar que o merecia, mas não obriga a dar conselhos” 
(107). Describing himself as having “o coração disposto a aceitar tudo, não por inclinação 
à harmonia, senão por tédio à controvérsia” (33-34), Aires agrees readily with his 
interlocutors or, confronted with a dispute among others of his acquaintance, delicately 
proffers a conciliatory middle ground. Facing a dilemma, he chooses neither horn and 
when unable to endorse a given opinion, he consigns his own reflections to his private 
Memorial, safely removed from the realm of interpersonal discourse and action. Like Aires, 
Flora does not arrive at fixed views, but where the retired diplomat will assent to nearly 
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any proposition in order to avoid conflict, the contemplative young artist eschews 
superficial accord, having an “inclinação natural por defender os ausentes, que não podiam 
responder por nada” (167). Indeed, the two characters come to discuss this divergence of 
attitude, noting Flora’s apparently contradictory habit of defending each twin when in the 
presence of the other and Aires’s practice of agreeing with one and all, which leads him to 
endorse incompatible points of view at different points in time. 
What are we to make of these attitudes? What effects do the conciliatory Aires and 
contradictory Flora have in Esaú e Jacó’s interpretation of Brazil? It is tempting to take 
Aires and Flora as, respectively, heroic and tragic players in the drama. José Raimundo Maia 
Neto has argued that Aires manifests Machado’s interest in Pyrrhonian skepticism by living 
out the suspension of judgment and thereby avoiding conflict and strife. And if we think, 
as some have, that Aires appears as an approximation of the author’s own subjectivity, “o 
alter ego mais evoluído do escritor” (Gomes 1120), we might take some satisfaction in the 
Conselheiro’s nonchalant position as an observer of events and relationships, who goes 
about leisurely from beginning to end “apalpando a botoeira, onde viçava a mesma flor 
eterna” (Assis, Esaú de Jacó 221). Similarly, we might take Flora, the thoughtful, serious, 
fair-minded young woman, as tragically incapable of making an evidently essential choice 
between the twins Pedro and Paulo because, as Luiz Costa Lima argues “Ela não se decide 
porque os partidos que se lhe apresentam não são partidos, i.e., os pretendentes não são de 
fato diferentes. Optar entre Pedro e Paulo seria escolher apenas um nome diferente” 
(Dispersa Demanda 110). Following Eunice Piazza Gai, we could then take Aires as an 
allegory of skepticism, a beneficial attitude of intellectual dispassion, and poor Flora as an 
allegory of life-crippling doubt, unsuccored by the suspension of judgment (epochê) and 
incapable of attaining the redemption of Pyrrhonian tranquility (ataraxia). 
Yet too many considerations weigh against this schematic. Though Aires appears to 
practice the suspension of judgment and, in so doing, seems to avoid suffering, 
consideration reveals some distance between ‘esse Aires’ and the paradigmatic Pyrrhonian 
described by Sextus Empiricus in his Outlines of Skepticism, likely the most influential 
source on the subject to survive antiquity. Sextus defines skepticism in contrast with two 
competing approaches to philosophy: Dogmatic and Academic. Dogmatism encompasses 
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any philosophy that claims to have found some truth, while Academic thought includes 
any claim that truth cannot be attained. “The Skeptics,” Sextus continues, “continue to 
search” (89). There is some uncertainty among philosophers regarding this claim, since it 
appears to impute to the skeptic an ongoing effort to arrive at firm or fixed conclusions – a 
strange requirement for an intellectual attitude characterized by the suspension of 
judgment. Though there are various possible interpretations of the skeptic’s commitment 
to ongoing investigation, Benson Mates helps considerably in pointing out that “If Sextus 
himself is a typical Pyrrhonist, it appears that the principal way in which Pyrrhonists ‘search 
for truth’ is to raise questions about assertions purporting to be true” (224). 
Whether taken as the narrator of Esaú e Jacó or the character within the novel, and 
though somewhat Pyrrhonian in contenting himself to comment on how things appear 
(phenomena) and avoiding any commitment as to how they are in reality (noumena), 
Conselheiro Aires harbors little interest in any search for truth, however defined. Above 
all, his habit of easily agreeing with the assertions of others diverges starkly from Sextus’s 
skeptic, whose attitude of continual questioning must lead him to challenge the claims and 
convictions of his fellows. Aires seems to escape the strife exemplified by the twins Pedro 
and Paulo and the misery suffered by Flora, but his apparent contentment does not result 
from the Pyrrhonian’s careful weighing of opposing views, suspension of judgment via 
recognition of the equipollence of contradictory arguments, and the tranquility that, 
according to Sextus, naturally results “as a shadow follows the body” (93). Instead, far from 
this model of intellectual responsibility, Aires is merely detached, disinterested in the 
questions, doubts, and struggles that motivate others around him. His moral conformism 
is not the pragmatic refuge of the skeptic who has reflected and found no stable criterion 
of ethical judgment, but the disengaged complacency of the incurably privileged. Aires, 
then, must either be taken as a quasi-skeptic who on inspection fails to fill out the 
Pyrrhonian mold or else as a cutting caricature of the skeptical figure. In either case, his 
attitude in the end seems no more admirable than those offered by the rest of the 
intellectually irresponsible characters populating the young Brazilian Republic. 
Flora is the only exception. Flora, whose birth coincides with the passage of the Lei 
do Ventre Livre and associates her with the dream of liberty; the same Flora whose sense 
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of fairness allows her to balance the merits of each twin against the other’s and who engages 
with each of the suitors by defending his brother as his equal in merit. This Flora who is 
defined, prophetically, by Aires as ‘inexplicável’, a claim he adumbrates by comparing her 
to those artists who, never satisfied, 
pintam sem acabar de pintar. Botam tinta, mais tinta, outra tinta, pouca tinta, nova tinta, e nunca 
lhes parece que a árvore é árvore, nem a choupana, choupana. Se se trata então de gente, adeus. Por 
mais que os olhos da figura falem, sempre esses pintores cuidam que eles não dizem nada. E retocam 
com tanta paciência, que alguns morrem entre dois olhos, outros matam-se de desespero (69).  
 
 Flora-Brasil, Flora the inexplicable. Aires’s characterization betrays, despite his 
affection for the young woman, an impatience with what he evidently takes to be simple 
indecision, but which, in fact, turns out to be a more apt approximation of skepticism than 
any assayed by the aging Conselheiro himself. Tempting as it is to explain away Flora’s 
refusal or inability to choose one twin over the other, as Luiz Costa Lima does, by insisting 
that the twins are indistinguishable because they are ultimately equivalent, it is not clear 
that Machado’s text supports this interpretation. In the chapter titled “A Grande Noite,” 
Flora, in a half-waking vision, penetrates the soul of each twin and finds in each one an 
indefinable essence that is not found in the other. Though on the surface the twins may 
appear interchangeable and though others might struggle at times to tell them apart, Flora 
perceives their profoundly different natures: Paulo’s ambition, his drive to remake the 
world into what it ought to be; Pedro’s moderation, his promise of preservation and 
stability. As Antonio Candido recognized, Flora – the skeptic, the inexplicable – perceives 
that “evidentemente as duas possibilidades são legítimas” (26). On what basis shall she 
choose one over the other? Flora finds no criterion that would allow her to choose between 
the twins’ ethical proposals. Eunice Piazza Gai might see this as an allegory of doubt, but 
here Mates again shows the way, reminding us that “the characteristic attitude of the 
Pyrrhonian skeptic is, as we have said, not doubt but rather aporia, that is being at a loss, 
baffled, perplexed, puzzled, stumped, stymied” (30). Flora, not Aires, practices the ongoing 
questioning of the skeptic and demonstrates the equipollence of Pedro’s patience and 
Paulo’s temerity, falling finally into aporia.  
Despite what some have argued, Machado’s novel will not serve as a Pyrrhonian 
playground. Flora’s skepticism will not save her; quite the opposite. She will be the only 
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character to take significant care in developing views and opinions, but she will find herself 
terminally ‘at a loss, baffled, perplexed, puzzled, stumped, stymied.’ The Pyrrhonian 
promise will not avail her; she will find no tranquility in declining the choice, but remain 
tortured by the need to choose. Compare Aires’s analogy of the perfectionist painters with 
a strikingly similar tale from Sextus: 
 
Indeed, what happened to the Skeptic is just like what is told of Apelles the painter. For it is said that 
once upon a time, when he was painting a horse and wished to depict the horse’s froth, he failed so 
completely that he gave up and threw his sponge at the picture – the sponge on which he used to 
wipe the paints from his brush – and that in striking the picture the sponge produced the desired 
effect. So, too, the Skeptics were hoping to achieve ataraxia by resolving the anomaly of phenomena 
and noumena, and, being unable to do this, they suspended judgment. But then, by chance as it 
were, when they were suspending judgment the ataraxia followed, as a shadow follows the body. 
(93) 
 
 Unlike Apelles and the ancient skeptics, Flora cannot take solace in avoiding the 
choice before her – she cannot throw her sponge at the picture. Or perhaps she can try – 
as when she turns over to Aires her drawing of the twins as one figure and stands silently 
by as he tears it to pieces – but she won’t feel any better for having attempted it. Machado’s 
interest in skepticism is a thoroughly modern, post-Cartesian worry about our apparent 
inability to properly ground or defend our convictions, while we are condemned to hold 
positions and takes sides. This, in Machado’s allegory of the young nation at the threshold 
of modernity, is the situation of Brazil. The rising nation must be free to make a just choice 
of its future. But on what basis could it do so? Flora’s death in the 1890s, as Floriano 
Peixoto turned the might of the state against the people and pitted the young Republic 
against the maturing nation, comes to signify the ruin of her moment of promise. The 
flowering of the nation founders “inexplicably” on the shoals of skepticism: unable to 
decide among conflicting views and values, unable to avoid deciding. Not being one thing 




In an essay on Machado’s realism, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht contrasts the author’s 
approach with that of one of his notable contemporaries and friends. While Machado’s 
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novels are characterized by “changing configurations of narrative instability” (33), Euclides 
da Cunha employed “discursive techniques and techniques of documentation adopted 
from the contemporary state of the natural sciences to describe a revolt of masses excluded 
from Brazilian society and its brutal repression by the national military” (34). His opus Os 
Sertões, an “attempt at an objective description, turned into a manifesto of compassion and 
a pledge for political change” (34-35). For Gumbrecht, “Nothing could have been further 
from Machado’s playful instability than this gesture of objectivity and the pathos of 
existential seriousness with which Euclides was writing” (35). There can be little doubt 
about the depth of divergence in tone and narrative attitude in the best-known works of 
these two writers. Where Machado’s discourse constructs the realm of the fictional and his 
frequently ironic and humorous narration offers oblique representation and criticism of 
contemporary and historical reality, Euclides commits to describing, portraying, 
discussing, and narrating the realm of science, facts, and truth, albeit artistically. Euclides’s 
bombastic style and his bluntly structured, deterministic account of the Canudos campaign 
contribute to the reception of his work not only as a paradigmatic effort to interpret Brazil, 
but also as a paragon of scientistic, naturalistic, positivistic dogmatism. 
But what are we to make of his conclusion? Euclides closes his colossal effort with 
an utterly characteristic, but frankly bizarre chapter of “duas linhas,” which depending on 
the edition actually fit quite comfortably on just one: “É que ainda não existe um Maudsley 
para as loucuras e os crimes das nacionalidades” (781). There might be no more typical or 
more pedantic element of Euclides’s style than to start a sentence, or here a chapter, with a 
synthetic “é que,” a conjunction that belies the author’s apparent decision to offer a 
conclusion by logically subordinating his ‘duas linhas’ to the preceding five or six hundred 
pages (again depending on the edition). To get to this point, one must follow Euclides’s 
report of the atrocities of the Canudos campaign, his anthropological survey of the people 
of the sertão, and his portrait of the eco-geological conditions underlying ways of life in 
the region. One might think it plain, having slowly and sometimes painfully trudged 
through the book’s sweeping exposition and grandiose narration, that the final lines express 
the author’s grim satisfaction in producing a monument of both Western science and 
Brazilian cultural development with a frankly immodest, if indirect, claim of Maudsley-
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like greatness. If you have read my enormous book, Euclides seems to say, then all is 
explained – not just Canudos and not just Brazil, but the natural laws that govern the 
psychoses and the sins of all the nations of the earth. You know all you need to know. 
There has been no Maudsley for the faults of nations – until now… 
But it is not clear that this is correct. Certainly, Euclides thought of his work as 
building upon, correcting, and completing European scientific discourses with which he 
engaged. Just as the conclusion and meaning of Os Sertões will ultimately be bound up in 
the missing Maudsley of national psychology, Euclides seems to relish other opportunities 
to expose the inadequacy of European thought for an analysis of Brazil, as when he 
describes Northeastern Brazil as subject to “uma categoria geográfica que Hegel não citou” 
(133). But in order to take Os Sertões as an attempt to produce a “Pathology of Nationality” 
or “Responsibility in Mentally Diseased Nations”, we would have to assess not only 
whether Euclides succeeds in explaining national crimes and insanities, but also what kind 
of explanation might be on offer and whether or not the book is really committed to 
delivering it. 
Though it is not unusual for critics to note the peculiarity of these final lines, 
detailed comment on their importance is uncommon and readers of Euclides are divided 
as to what to make of them. Curiously, Adriana Michéle Campos Johnson, who studies 
how Os Sertões “sentenced” the subaltern community of Belo Monte by closing the book 
on the significance of the Canudos campaign and its victims, sees little of interest in how 
Euclides closes his own book, stating simply that “da Cunha’s book ends with the end of 
Canudos, the corpse of the Conselheiro, and a lament that there is no Maudsley for ‘acts 
of madness and crimes on the part of nations’” (165). But other critics have found these 
puzzling words significant and useful in drawing out lines of interpretation. Luiz Costa 
Lima, arguing that Os Sertões almost completely subordinates its aesthetic project to an 
incomplete, even sloppy pretention of scientific authority, takes the concluding reference 
to Maudsley as both an indication of Euclides’s poor reading or misrepresentation of the 
British psychiatrist and as a sign of his inability to live up to his own ambitions as an 
exponent of the scientific mentality. Costa Lima understands Maudsley (or at any rate the 
Maudsley he supposes Euclides to have read) as primarily concerned with pathology and 
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criminality in individuals and little interested in social or cultural factors relating to mental 
illness and unlawful conduct – anything approaching a notion of national crime and 
insanity. Consequently, on this reading, Euclides’s second and final reference to Maudsley 
underscores an apparent carelessness about the domain of investigation and a lack of self-
awareness regarding the empirical and theoretical difficulties raised by the author’s own 
work. According to Costa Lima, “Euclides da Cunha faz da ciência um campo de crença e 
de absoluta autoridade. Ao mesmo tempo, hesita e recua ante a necessidade de examiná-la 
e não só de aplicá-la. A ciência então se torna um mecanismo a ser manipulado” (Terra 
Ignota 121). Euclides’s final reference to Maudsley becomes not only symptomatic of the 
author’s cavalier or disingenuous exploitation of the supposedly authoritative texts he cites, 
but also, more broadly, an indication of his intellectual limitations as a theorist or 
interpreter of Brazil. For Costa Lima, the overall aesthetic disappointment of Os Sertões is 
supplemented by its failure as a scientific project capable of interrogating its own 
suppositions, biases, and parameters. 
Costa Lima’s provocative assessment of Os Sertões has been met with an equally 
interesting rebuttal by Leopoldo Bernucci, who defends Euclides on a number of grounds. 
Against the charge of misreading his sources, Bernucci points out that the Maudsley text 
most likely consulted by Euclides, the French edition of Responsibility in Mental Disease 
(Le crime et la folie), and other works by the British psychiatrist do in fact address, if in 
limited degree, communal and national dimensions of mental illness and the social 
construction of criminality and madness. More substantively, however, and while allowing 
that Euclides’s text seems to present multiple contradictions, Bernucci argues that these are 
only apparent, “na medida em que estas deixam de ser antinômicas para serem aporísticas” 
(31, my emphasis). For Bernucci, the tensions of Os Sertões remain in the realm of aporia 
(rather than outright, antinomic, contradiction) because its discursive attitude does not 
univocally commit to either conflicting position, let alone to both. Discussing as an 
exemplary case Euclides’s dismissal of phrenology in the middle of Os Sertões and his 
recovery of the approach in the final pages, Bernucci contends that the author is not to be 
criticized for falling into aporia or apparent contradiction, since this was simply the 
situation of psychological theory at the time: “Para questão tão complexa e assistemática 
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como os estudos sobre a loucura realizados no século XIX, tanto para Euclides, Raimundo 
Nina Rodrigues, Maudsley, quanto para outros que se debruçaram sobre o problema, era 
impossível evitar as aporias, os paradoxos e as situações aparentemente contraditórias na 
descrição dos fenômenos psicopatológicos” (38). Returning us to the idea that the missing 
Maudsley of national madness and misdemeanor is supposed to be Euclides himself, 
Bernucci concludes that 
 
Para compreender corretamente a enigmática e última frase de Os Sertões é preciso reler 
atentamente e uma vez mais os estudos do psiquiatra inglês. [...] Euclides [...] certamente pensou 
naqueles ‘mercenários inconscientes’ que, como aqueles loucos criminosos que estuda o psiquiatra, 
e que segundo este deveriam estar legalmente isentos da punição máxima, não sabiam o que estavam 
fazendo. Chegou a entender também que Maudsley, em perspectiva sociológica, estava bem 
aparelhado e talvez muito próximo de teorizar sobre as insânias nacionais. Restava saber quem mais 
e com semelhantes qualificações, além, é certo, do próprio Euclides nessas seiscentas páginas, estaria 
gabaritado para o desafio de lidar com as loucuras e os crimes das nacionalidades” (38-39). 
 
 Bernucci’s defense – that Euclides’s narrative-treatise avoids incoherence by 
eschewing commitment to the incompatible possibilities and perspectives he contemplates 
– is both too strong and too weak as it stands. Too strong, because it implies that the 
discursive voice of Os Sertões is not fully committed to the truth of its assertions – as 
Bernucci himself puts it, “muitos dos enunciados em Os Sertões não podem ser nem 
refutados, nem assegurados, porque pela própria natureza de sua articulação discursiva não 
são passíveis de afirmação, nem de negação” (32) – a claim strikingly at odds with the tenor 
of the text. This is plainly seen by consideration of the most emblematic apparent 
contradiction of Os Sertões, and which is perhaps the question in greatest need of a 
Maudsley at the end. Within the first lines of his “Nota Preliminar,” before even beginning 
in earnest, Euclides offers us the characteristic conundrum by declaring first that the 
violence of the Canudos campaign was an inevitable phase of historical development, 
requiring the “esmagamento inevitável das raças fracas pelas raças fortes,” but within a page 
insists that the same events constitute a violation that must be condemned: “E foi, na 
significação integral da palavra, um crime. Denunciemo-lo” (66-67). The difficulty of 
explaining how an inevitable conflict could be a crime will not be resolved by contending 
that the conflicting propositions cannot be affirmed or denied – since, patently, they can 
be – or by supposing that the text withholds full assent from each of the contraries – 
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because, evidently, it asserts each one loudly and clearly. But the defense is too weak as 
well. If we suppose, as Bernucci does, that Euclides wrote and thought carefully and 
therefore that his apparent contradictions represent his use of aporia to avoid committing 
to propositions worth considering but not ultimately meriting avowal, we will be left with 
little to say about what, in the end, Os Sertões is supposed to reveal, explain, or illuminate. 
For in what sense could Euclides emerge as uniquely “gabaritado para o desafio de lidar 
com as loucuras e os crimes das nacionalidades” (39), if, despite his preoccupation with 
scientific explanation by reference to natural laws, his claims are not to be read as truth-
aspiring affirmations? 
 Nor can the problem be avoided by minimizing Euclides’s commitment to 
scientific explanation, which is evident not only in the organizational structure of the work 
(beginning with an ecology, which then supports his anthropology, which then supports 
his military history) and his references to scientific theory (meteorological, social-
evolutionary, psychiatric, etc.), but in his language. The rhetoric of Os Sertões is shot 
through with claims of explanation and references to laws of nature. Among the many 
things that Euclides considers explained or explainable: 
(1) Por um contraste explicável entre as disposições orográficas, rodeiam-no, 
contudo, paragens exubertantes. (344) 
(2) Todas as manifestações complexas de religiosidade indefinida, são 
explicáveis. (239) 
(3) É que por um efeito explicável de adaptação às condições estreitas do meio 
ingrato, evolvendo penosamente em círculos estreitos, aquelas mesmo que 
tanto se diversificam nas matas ali se talham por um molde único. (116-117) 
(4) Ora, nada mais explicável do que este permanente contraste entre extremas 
manifestações de força e agilidade e longos intervalos de apatia. (214) 
 
 Euclides is likewise free with his appeals to laws of nature: 
(5) Toda a climatologia, inscrita nos amplos lineamentos das leis cosmológicas 
gerais, desponta em qualquer parte adicta de preferência às causas naturais 
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mais próximas e particulares. Um clima é como que a tradução fisiológica 
de uma condição geográfica. (157) 
(6) As leis naturais pelo próprio jogo parecem extinguir, a pouco e pouco, o 
produto anômalo que as viola, afogando-o nas próprias fontes geradoras […] 
É que são invioláveis as leis do desenvolvimento das espécies. (201) 
(7) Homens de todas as cores, amálgamas de diversas raças, parece que no 
sobrevir dos lances perigosos e no abalo de emoções fortíssimas lhes 
preponderam, exclusivas, no ânimo, por uma lei qualquer de psicologia 
coletiva, os instintos guerreiros, a imprevidência dos selvagens, a 
inconsciência do perigo, o desapego à vida e o arremesso fatalista para a 
morte. (451-452) 
 
 If Bernucci’s defense will not go through – if Os Sertões is built of contradictions 
that cannot be neutralized by denying that the text makes assertions of fact – are we left 
only with Costa Lima’s option, that the book is an interesting failure? Can we only read it 
as an attempt at a grand explanation of Canudos, Brazil, and History that is entirely undone 
by its internal messiness? Despite the difficulties we have seen in applying his reading, 
Bernucci hints at an alternative: we can read Os Sertões, despite its apparent dogmatism, 
as a work of skeptical aporia, a realization of the fragility of our claims of knowledge and a 
frustrated uncertainty about whether our best explanations teach us what to do. 
 As much as Euclides claims to explain, it is clear that he is just as preoccupied with 
what is unknown or inexplicable. The sertão itself and its inhabitants are scandalously 
unknown to the national center:  
(8)  As nossas melhores cartas, enfeixando informes escassos, lá têm um claro 
expressivo, um hiato, Terra ignota, em que se aventura o rabisco de um rio 
problemático ou idealização de uma corda de serras. (80) 
(9) Para obviar este inconveniente, levaram uma bomba artesiana, como se 
fossem conhecidas as camadas profundas da terra pelos que lhe ignoravam a 
própria superfície. (433) 
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(10) aqueles lugares estão, como vimos, entre os mais desconhecidos da nossa 
terra. (344) 
(11) E como aquele povo desconhecido de matutos lhes devolvia, dia a dia, 
mutilados e abatidos, os companheiros que meses antes tinham avançado 
robustos e alteneiros, não havia ânimo varonil que atentasse impassível para 
as bandas do sertão misterioso e agro… (678) 
 
 But these are not the only lacunae. It is not merely incidental that the Republican 
center, the regional elites and urban population of the national and state capitals, had no 
acquaintance or understanding of the sertão. For as many times as Euclides claims to have 
explained the phenomena of the sertão, on as many occasions he declares them inexplicable 
(sometimes even while simultaneously trying to offer an explanation!): 
(12) Aparecem [os cabeças-de-frade] de modo inexplicável, sobre a pedra nua, 
dando, realmente, no tamanho, na conformação, no modo por que se 
espalham, a imagem singular de cabeças decepadas e sanguinolentas jogadas 
por ali, a esmo, numa desordem trágica. É que estreitíssima frincha lhes 
permitiu insinuar, através da rocha, a raiz longa e capilar até a parte inferior, 
onde acaso existam, livres da evaporação, uns restos de umidade. (124) 
(13) A natureza não cria normalmente os desertos. Combate-os, repulsa-os. 
Desdobram-se, lacunas inexplicáveis, às vezes sob as linhas astronômicas 
definidoras da exuberância máxima da vida. (135-136) 
(14) Os jagunços em desordem, contudo, depois do primeiro arranco da fuga, 
volveram ainda ao mesmo resistir inexplicável […] Como sempre, os 
sertanejos tornavam incompleto o sucesso, ressurgindo inexplicavelmente 
dentre os estragos de um combate perdido. (562-563) 
(15) E quando, afinal jugulados, eram conduzidos à presença dos chefes militares, 
iam conformados ao destino deplorável. Revestiam-se de serenidade 
estranha e uniforme, inexplicável entre lutadores de tão variados matizes, e 
tão discordes caracteres, mestiços de toda a sorte, variando, díspares, na 




 Not only is the sertão itself inexplicable, but it “naturally” induces inexplicable 
actions on the part of the Republican military: “É natural que não fossem as operações 
concertadas com a indispensáve lucidez e que as inquinassem, desde o primeiro passo nos 
caminhos, todos os erros e inexplicáveis descuidos e inexplicável olvido de preceitos 
rudimentares, já rudemente corrigidos ou expostos com a maior clareza nos desastres 
anteriores” (431). And not only does the encounter between the rest of Brazil and the sertão 
erode the apparently solid bedrock of military training and principles, but news of the 
“inconceivable” defeat results in a fevered search for explanations that convince the nation 
of immediate danger to the Republic itself: 
Foi a princípio o espanto; depois um desvairamento geral da opinião; um intenso agitar de conjeturas 
para explicar o inconceptível do acontecimento […]. Era preciso uma explicação qualquer para 
sucessos de tanta monta. Encontraram-na: os distúrbios sertanejos significavam pródromos de 
vastíssima conspiração contra as instituições recentes (497-498).  
 
This dubious explanation, held with utter conviction by defenders of the Republic 
across Brazil, would justify the fourth expedition and ultimately the extermination of the 
rebellious sertanejos. 
 In retrospect, from the vantage of his narration, Euclides can condemn this 
confusion and its terrible outcomes, but he cannot dismiss the question that it raises: are 
we justified in the certainty with which we explain the world around us, our history, our 
compatriots? Having been so profoundly wrong about what was happening in Canudos in 
the early stages of the conflict, as a member of the Republican elite, can Euclides now affirm 
his account of what happened and why? It seems not. The sertão will remain a realm that 
is not merely unknown but unknowable, where even the inviolable laws of nature do not 
apply. Euclides cannot give up his attempt to explain the events of the campaign, the people 
of the sertão, and the land they live on, but as much as he strains to explicate, he will find 
as much that is inexplicable, and which lands him in aporia: “at a loss, baffled, perplexed, 
puzzled, stumped, stymied” (Mates 30). Things will become muddled, not because 
Euclides didn’t think through what he was doing or because he lacked a sense that 
important events and phenomena require explication, but because his impulse to explain, 
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driven by his sense of horror, is counterbalanced by a worry that even the most obvious-
seeming explanation might go wide off the point. 
It is telling that in her recent translation of Os Sertões, Elizabeth Lowe deemed it 
necessary to supplement Euclides’s summary remark in order to render his final lines: “It 
is truly regrettable that in these times we do not have a Maudsley, who knew the difference 
between good sense and insanity, to prevent nations from committing acts of madness and 
crimes against humanity” (465). While the notion of a crime against humanity may have 
been alien to Euclides, Lowe recognizes what may be the most important difference 
between Euclides and Maudsley, and the reason that Os Sertões cannot ultimately carry an 
implicit subtitle along the lines of “The Crimes and Madness of Mixed-Race Nations.” 
The British psychiatrist described and theorized about many dimensions of mental illness. 
He explained a great many phenomena, as Euclides also attempts to do. But Maudsley, as 
a physician, was also prescriptive. His explanation of how psychological ailments arise led 
him to recommend specific attitudes toward and treatments for those afflicted by them. 
Euclides makes no such attempt as he concludes his book. His criticisms of Brazil’s 
formation or current state of affairs, its system of governance and its racial composition, 
his observations of fact and conjectures on the laws of nature lead him to no 
recommendation or prediction for the nation and its sertões.
3




If it is too much to say that Flora inspired Euclides, not least because Os Sertões 
was published before Esaú e Jacó, it might not be too much to say that Euclides inspired 
Flora. Not in the sense that Machado in any deliberate way designed his ill-starred maiden 
as a portrayal of his friend the engineer – there is no evidence for this. But if we take 
Machado seriously as an artist and an intellectual, then we do well to consider whether his 
oft maligned and sometimes celebrated pessimism was not in fact an expression of an astute 
                                                 
3
 It might be objected that Euclides famously includes some prescriptions in his book, as when he advocates 
irrigating the sertão on the model of the ancient Romans. However, the point is that by the time we arrive at 
the tragic denouement of the conflict and the frustrated concluding lines of the book, Euclides’s aporia seems 
to have sapped whatever prescriptive energy or attention he might have shown earlier.  
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appreciation not only of the condition of Brazil and not merely of his own position within 
it, but also of a malady afflicting fellow intellectuals like Euclides. In Flora, Machado 
characterizes those peers who attempted to dance what José Murilo de Carvalho has called 
the “maxixe do republicano doido,” who tried to make sense of a troubled nation at a time 
marked by “grande movimentação de ideias, em geral importadas da Europa […], mal 
absorvidas ou absorvidas de modo parcial e seletivo, resultando em grande confusão 
ideológica” (24, 42). Flora’s illness is Euclides’s. It is not the skepticism of an Aires or a 
Pyrrho; it is not a rejection of judgment and conviction that might provide solace by 
avoiding conflict and the exhaustion of constantly revising one’s views. It is the agony of 
apprehending an inability to reconcile the conflicting views one cannot relinquish and a 
powerlessness to choose between alternatives – not because they are one or equivalent or 
indistinguishable, but because one lacks a defensible basis for determining which would be 
the just choice, the best choice, the greatest expression of freedom. For Machado and 
Euclides, interpreters of Brazil, bearers of half-lit beacons, “tudo se mistura, à meia 
claridade” (Esaú e Jacó 162). 
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